4th of a series

GENERAL SANTOS CITY(MindaNews/17 September) — If Muslim Autonomy, whether it is the ARMM or the BJE version, is real autonomy, it must have a strong economic economy. With weak economy like what the present ARMM has, political autonomy is meaningless. From this, the Bangsamoro quest in MOA-AD for their ancestral domain, lands and other resources must be understood.

III. Resources

The 12-consensus-point strand “Resources” is controversial because of the powers granted the BJE in the development of the economic resources of the Moro Homeland. By these powers, the Moro Homeland is free from the control of the Manila government – unlike in the case of the ARMM — with a partnership, not a benefactor-beneficiary or master-subject relationship.

Curiously, it should be asked:

What is wrong in empowering the BJE “with authority and responsibility for the land use, development, conservation and disposition of the natural resources within the homeland”? (Consensus 1) (See also: Consensuses 2 and 3)

What is wrong with the rationale behind the grant of such powers: to “reinforce their economic self-sufficiency”?

Strategic Minerals

Of the four “measures to make progress more rapid” enumerated under Consensus 1, stimulating the local economy to address unemployment and living conditions (b), uprooting the causes of poverty (c), and reviewing “public services, industrial or trade-related and agrarian related issues”(d) should be positively appreciated.

What is being objected to as excessive, as well as unconstitutional, is Consensus 1.a that empowers the BJE: “Entry into joint development, utilization and exploitation of natural resources designed as commons and shared resources, which is tied to the full setting of appropriate institution, particularly affecting strategic minerals.”

This suggests that the BJE can enter into joint ventures with domestic and foreign investors in the exploitation of the natural resources — in particular strategic minerals which under Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution “shall be under the full control and supervision of the State”.

The ARMM, under R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054, is vested with the authority to control and supervise the “exploration, utilization, development and protection of mines and minerals” within the region except “the strategic minerals”. This is also stipulated in the 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement.

“Strategic minerals” are “uranium petroleum and other fossil fuels, mineral oils, all sources of potential energy”. These are speculated to be abundant in the ARMM. Is economic autonomy not essential to Muslim autonomy? Is withholding these strategic minerals not undermining economic autonomy?

The policy is cockeyed. The ARMM can explore, use, develop and protect mineral resources (R.A. 9054, Article XII, Section 5) but not the highly demanded strategic minerals which are reserved for the national government. Yes, the choicest cuts are always for the masters.

Foreign Trade

Consensus 4 has two very controversial stipulations:

First, “The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries” with the condition “that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic the Philippines”.

Second, by right, the BJE has the “option to establish and open Bangsamoro trade missions in foreign countries with which it has economic cooperation agreements”.

These agreements are condemned for being unconstitutional. But the ARMM can enter into economic agreements: “Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Regional Government shall evolve a system of economic agreements and trade compacts to generate block grants for regional investments and improvements of regional economic structures which shall be authorized by law enacted by the Regional Assembly.” (R.A. 9054, Article IX, Section 11)

While not explicitly said, Section 11 implies that the “economic agreements and trade compacts” are between the ARMM and foreign countries. The MOA-AD is explicit: “any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries”. Is the implicit constitutional but the explicit unconstitutional?

If foreign trade relations are constitutional as implied in Section 11, why should trade missions be unconstitutional? They are necessary to promote trade relations.

MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari, as ARMM governor, spent much of his first year in office as a one-man trade mission to foreign capitals inviting investors to invest in the ARMM and other SZOPAD provinces. Did he violate the 1987 Constitution?

Int’l Meetings

Consensus 4 has more controversial stipulations:

Third, “… the Central Government shall take necessary steps to ensure the BJE’s participation in international meetings and events, e.g. ASEAN meetings and other specialized agencies of the United Nations.”

Fourth, this obligation of the Central Government (Third, above) “shall entitle the BJE’s participation in Philippine official missions and delegations that are engaged in the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for (a) environment protection,(and b) equitable sharing of incomes and revenues, in the areas of sea, seabed and inland seas or bodies of water adjacent to or between islands forming part of the ancestral domain, in addition to those of fishing rights”.

Objections to these agreements have no constitutional basis but spring from anti-Muslim bias and prejudices akin to ridicule: The Muslims are demanding too much, not so different from how masters sneer at their subjects who desire to be treated as equals.

However, these are essentially the same as the GRP-MNLF agreement on Muslim right to representation in the national government and organs of the state, Paragraphs 63-67, 1996 FPA. These are embodied in R.A. 9054, Article V, Sections 4-7.

The “system of economic agreement and trade compacts” is for the ARMM to generate funds for the regional economy. Consensus 4 should be viewed similarly instead of viewing it with anti-Muslim bias, prejudice and cynicism.

International meetings and Philippine official missions, including the President’s state visits, offer opportunities to invite investors. Should the BJE be denied such opportunities?

Negotiations of border agreements or environmental protection adjacent to the Moro Homeland involve BJE economic and related interests. Should the BJE be denied the right to cooperate with the national government to protect and promote regional and national interests?

Two More

Also objected to in Consensus 6 is the 75-25 sharing with the national government in favor of the BJE of revenues generated in the region. In R.A. 6734, the sharing is 60-40; in R.A. 9054, 70-30, except in strategic minerals which is 50-50. Will this redound to better fiscal stability?

Consensus 7 provides that:

(1)  “The legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust dispossession of their territorial and proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization shall be acknowledged.”

(2)  “Whenever restoration is no longer possible, the GRP shall take effective measures or adequate reparation collectively beneficial to the Bangsamoro people , in such quality, quantity and status to be determined mutually by both Parties.”

The MNLF did not demand these during the negotiations of the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 or of the Peace Agreement of 1996. The first is exacting acknowledgment of injustice done; the second, reparation for such injustice.

This is a daring but not a novel demand that should be weighed by its merits. There were cases in the United States when the Indians were awarded by the U.S. Supreme Court compensations for illegal dispossession of their lands covered by treaties.

The Rest

The last five consensus points under “Resources” should occasion no controversy. They are regulatory and organizational – unless the authority given the BJE and its relation with the national government is questioned.

Consensuses 8 and 9: The authority granted the BJE has also been given to the ARMM in Article XII, Section 5(d) of R.A. 9054: “Except as provided in this Organic Act, existing leases, permits, licenses, franchises, and concessions shall be respected until their expiration unless legally terminated earlier as provided by law enacted either by Congress or by the Regional Assembly”.

Consensus 10 calls for the establishment of “a five-member BJE economic-expert mission” or “the Mission” the functions of which are detailed in Consensuses 11 and 12. There is no similar concession in either R.A. 6734 or R.A. 9054 for the ARMM.

By its functions and membership, the establishment of the Mission is an innovative strategy for “reconstruction and development”. Examine, first, its functions and, then, its membership:

Consensus 11: “The Mission … shall cooperate fully with all organizations in involved in the implementation of the peace settlement”. And, “It shall launch a plan and joint international appeal for the reparation and development of the conflict affected areas in Mindanao.

Consensus 12: The members will be appointed by (a) the Third Party facilitator – two from international institutions, one of whom will be the chairman; (b) two by the BJE, one of whom will the co-chairman; and, (c) one member by the national government.

If the primary objective of Muslim autonomy is to empower the Bangsamoro people to become genuinely autonomous politically and economically, what is unconstitutional with their quest for resources that they can fully develop by their own efforts with assistance from the national government and the international communities?

(To Be Continued)

(”Comment” is Mr. Patricio P. Diaz’ column for MindaViews, the opinion section of MindaNews. The Titus Brandsma Media Awards recently honored Mr. Diaz with a “Lifetime Achievement Award” for his “commitment to education and public information to Mindanawons as Journalist, Educator and Peace Advocate.” You can reach him at patpdiazgsc@yahoo.com.This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it )

Source: Mindanews 

GENERAL SANTOS CITY (MindaNews / September 12) - Recapitulation: In sum, people (Bangsamoro: Consensus 1), territory (Bangsamoro homeland: Consensus 2), resources (ancestral domain and ancestral lands: Consensus 3), governance (self-governance as Bangsamoro right: Consensus 4), and the authority and jurisdiction of the autonomous government (the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity: Consensus 5) contemplated in the “Concept and Principles” strand of the MOA-AD are all contained in Article X, Sections 15 to 21 of the 1987 Constitution.

The only difference: Those elements of the Muslim autonomy are defined more comprehensively in “Concepts and Principles” than in Article X. Obviously, this comprehensiveness – spelled out in details in the next three strands — set off the alarm, opposition and protests on the issue of constitutionality. Pressured, President Arroyo rejected the MOA-AD.*

*[The turn-around of the Arroyo government – rejecting its own baby, the MOA-AD, and changing its peace process policy – has created an issue of constitutionality vs. the peace process. We will take this up in our concluding discussions.]

Territory

The consensus on “Territory” covers (1) the core and expanded geographical areas of BJE (Consensus 1, 2.a-e, 5); (2) the inland waters, territorial waters and lands (Consensus 2.f-g, 3); (3) what to do with territorial waters (Consensus 2.h-k); political subdivisions (Consensus 4).

Article I of the 1987 Constitution defines the “national territory” as “consisting of its terrestrial, fluvial, and aerial domains, including its territorial sea, the seabed, the subsoil, the insular shelves, and other submarine areas”. And more:” The waters around, between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago, regardless of their breadth and dimensions, form part of the internal waters of the Philippines”.

Consensus 1 of “Territory” states: “The Bangsamoro homeland and historic territory refer to the land mass as well as the maritime, terrestrial, fluvial and alluvial domains, and the aerial domain, the atmospheric space above it, embracing the Mindanao-Sulu-Palawan geographic region.  However, delimitations are contained in the agreed Schedules (Categories or maps of Category A and Category B geographical areas). (Italics supplied)

Compare Article I with the italicized portions of Consensus I. This is the ground for critics and opponents of MOA-AD to charge the agreement of granting the MILF more than allowed by the Constitution. The following should be noted:

First: While Consensus 1 copies Article I, Consensus 2.f-g draw the demarcation lines of the BJE internal and territorial waters.  Neither R.A. 6734 nor R.A. 9054 defines the territory of the ARMM aside from the component provinces and cities; however, the ARMM map once displayed at the Office of the Governor showed demarcation lines.

Second: As implied in R.A. 6371 (the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997), the right to ownership of land is limited to the land surface only.  In the MOA-AD, the territorial rights granted the MILF exceeded the limits reserved for the state only.

Third: Because of these, the MOA-AD is deemed unconstitutional. Those who are unaware of, or who disregard Map A and Map B, conclude that the MILF is claiming the entire Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan.

A relevant question is: If by the above the MOA-AD is unconstitutional, will the peace process justify measures to remedy the unconstitutionality?

Core Area

In Consensus 2.c, six municipalities of Lanao del Norte – Baloi, Munai, Nunungan, Pantar, Tagoloan and Tankal – are included in the ARMM as the core area of BJE because they “voted for inclusion in the ARMM during the 2001 plebiscite”. There has been no protest from Lanao del Norte.  Yet, it should be asked: Is this unconstitutional?

They should have been realigned with Lanao del Sur as part of the ARMM in 2001. The provided-clause of Article X, Section 18, Paragraph 2 states: “… provided that only provinces, cities and geographical areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region”.  Perhaps, a few more barangays could have been included. (bold ours).

However, Congress deliberately revised Section 18 in Article II, Section 1(1) of R.A. 6734: “There is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution.” (bold ours)

Compare the bold-faced texts in the two quoted provisions above: “geographical areas”, which could mean municipalities or barangays, has been omitted in Article II, Section 1(1) of R.A. 6734. The same has also been omitted in Article II, Section 1 of R.A. 9054 that amended R.A. 6734 according to the 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement.

Has Congress the power to revise the Constitution in enacting laws? Are acts inconsistent with such laws but consistent with the original provision/s of the Constitution unconstitutional?

Categories A and B

Consensus 2.d proposes the inclusion of 735 barangays deemed contiguous with the ARMM through a plebiscite “within twelve (12) months following the signing of the MOA-AD. The proposal may have become academic but it has not lost its political interest; this or a similar proposal may be revived in pursuit of the peace process. So it is with Consensus 2.e.

Any imputation of unconstitutionality on Consensus 2.d and Consensus 2.e is off the mark since the Category A and B geographical areas are to be asked in a plebiscite their option to join or not to join the BJE – those in Category A, 12 months, and those in Category B, 25 years after the signing of MOA-AD.

The only question which is more of an enigma but not on constitutionality is the ambiguity of the MILF position. While in both consensus points “plebiscite” is provided, this position — by its language and statements outside of the MOA-AD — is unclear whether the MILF will accept unfavorable results of the plebiscite.  A clearly stated position would calm down the doubts.

There are two reactions from the concerned areas that enhance the tension. First, these areas voted NO in the 1989 and 2001 ARMM plebiscites, why ask them again to or not to join the BJE – a new name for the ARMM? Second, the geographical areas listed are – a significant number of them — not predominantly Muslim.

These should not be a source of tension. Concerning the first, a NO in the past plebiscites is not certain to be NO in the next. Give those who may want to change the chance to. Regarding the second, each barangay should have been followed by statistical facts: population showing Muslim-Christian percentages; numbers of YES and NO in the 2001 plebiscite.

Territorial Waters

Relative to the territorial waters, as well as the internal waters, their impact on the peace process should be more important than constitutionality. The Constitution should be a tool of the peace process not an obstacle.  As it was already pointed out, if constitutional amendment has been proposed to attract foreign investors, why not do the same for the peace process?

One paramount question is this: If foreign investors are welcome to develop the country’s natural resources, why are the Muslims unwelcome to own portions of those resources and to cooperate with the state in developing them?

Is their ability to carry out the activities enumerated in 2.i(1)(2) doubted? If so, help them develop their skills and with funds since they have expressed their intention to explore, utilize and do other activities to make productive their ancestral domain and lands.

In their articles on “Ancestral Domain, Ancestral Lands and Agrarian Reforms”, R.A. 6734 (XI) and R.A. 9054 (X) define lands and other resources of the ancestral domain and direct their development but sketchily compared to the consensus points of Territory of the MOA-AD. Is sketchiness constitutional and comprehensiveness unconstitutional?

Political Subdivisions

Consensus 4 states: “All territorial and geographical areas … may be formed or constituted into political subdivisions of the Bangsamoro territorial jurisdictions…” Obviously, this very general provision is subject to more discussions as to how the subdivisions would be done.

Section 2, Article VII of R.A. 6734 is more specific: “The Regional Assembly may create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of any municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria laid down by existing law subject to approval by a majority of the votes case in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.”

R.A. 9054 (Article VI, Section 19) lengthily amended this to include provinces and cities which inclusion the Supreme Court recently declared unconstitutional.  This gives a clue on how constitutional or unconstitutional Consensus 4 would be even if the power to form and constitute, per se, is not unconstitutional.

(To Be Continued)

(”Comment” is Mr. Patricio P. Diaz’ column for MindaViews, the opinion section of
MindaNews. Mr. Diaz is the recipient of a “Lifetime Achievement Award” from the Titus Brandsma for his “commitment to education and public information to Mindanawons as Journalist, Educator and Peace Advocate.” You may e-mail your comments to patpdiaz@mindanews.comThis e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it ).

QUEZON CITY (MindaNews/10 Sep) — The government has not only set aside the initialed but unsigned final draft of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)-Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD); it has also dissolved the GRP Peace Panel which negotiated the MOA. The way things work in this country, this can only mean that they (the panel) must have done something good. I therefore wish to give them some tribute.

In the Harvard Negotiation Project’s now classic book Getting to Yes: Negotiating an Agreement Without Giving In by Roger Fisher and William Ury, the first of four main points of method here is to “Separate the People from the Problem” One of the notes under this is that “Negotiators are people first.” In negotiations, one is dealing not with abstract representatives of the “other side” but with human beings. They have emotions, deeply held values, and different backgrounds and viewpoints. That’s why one basic rule in negotiations is “Be hard on issues but be soft with people.” And who are these people whom many in the Filipino Christian mainstream are being so hard with now?

The GRP Peace Panel Chairman was retired GEN. RODOLFO C. GARCIA from San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan. When he retired from the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) in 2004, he was Vice Chief of Staff. His military service in Mindanao dates back to 1970, after graduating from the Philippine Military Academy (PMA). He was a Platoon Leader and later Executive Officer in the 26^th Infantry Battalion, Philippine Army (PA), covering Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato and Zamboanga del Sur. He rose to become the Commander of the 6^th Infantry Division, PA in Central Mindanao in 1999. His transition from man of war to man of peace was made in 2003 when, while still AFP Vice Chief of Staff, he concurrently become Chairman of the GRP ceasefire committee for the peace process with the MILF. After the military retirement, he joined the Office of the Presidential Adviser of the Peace Process (OPAPP) as an Undersecretary, was appointed a member of the GRP Peace Panel and later became its Vice-Chairman. He took over as Chairman only in July 2007 after the stint of Sec. Silvestre C. Afable, Jr. who oversaw most of the ancestral domain negotiations up to June 2007.

The GRP Peace Panel Vice-Chairman was PROF. RUDY B. RODIL from Upi, Maguindanao and long-time resident of Iligan City. He is a Mindanao historian, author of several books on Mindanao, and a long-time now retired history professor at the Mindanao State University (MSU)-Iligan Institute of Technology (IIT). He is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in Philippine Studies at the University of the Philippines (UP) with a dissertation on ancestral domain, one of his lifelong fields of expertise. His active involvement in the government’s peace efforts started in 1988 as a Commissioner in the Regional Consultative Commission for drafting an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). He then became a member of the GRP Peace Panel for the third and final round of negotiations with the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) from 1992 to 1996. He was a special consultant to the GRP Peace Panel for talks with the MILF from 2001, becoming a panel member in 2004.

A third member of the GRP Peace Panel was SEC. NASSER C. PANGANDAMAN, a Maranao from Marawi City. He is the incumbent Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) since 2005. His stint in public service started in 1993 as Chairman of the ARMM 2000 Technical Committee. His involvement with the GRP-MILF peace talks started in 2004 when he was designated to the GRP Technical Working Group (TWG) on Ancestral Domain in his capacity as DAR Undersecretary for Mindanao Affairs and Indigenous Peoples. He later headed the TWG team dealing with the Territory Strand of Ancestral Domain. He became a panel member only in September 2007. He has a Bachelor of Laws degree from the Colegio de San Jose Recoletos (CSJR) in Cebu City.

A fourth member of the GRP Peace Panel was MS. SYLVIA OKINLAY-PARAGUYA, a Higaonon from Impasugong, Bukidnon. She is the Executive Director of the Mindanao Alliance of Self-Help Societies-Southern Philippines Educational Cooperative Center (MASS-SPEC) based in Cagayan de Oro City since 2000. She is also Chairperson of the Mindanao Coalition of Development NGO Networks (MINCODE), Commissioner-at-Large and Vice-Chair for Peace and Multi-Culturalism of the Mindanao Commission on Women, and Co-Chair of the Economic Development Committee of the Regional Development Council (RDC) of Region X. She is a Chemical Engineer by profession, graduating as National State Scholar and College Valedictorian at the Xavier University in Cagayan de Oro City in 1984. She also has a Master of Business Management degree from the Asian Institute of Management (AIM) as an AIM Scholar in 1990.

A fifth and alternate member of the GRP Peace Panel was ATTY. LEAH TANODRA-ARMAMENTO from Sibalum, Antique. She is presently the Assistant Chief State Prosecutor at the Department of Justice (DOJ) since 2003. Her legal career started with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as a Trial Attorney in 1986. She then moved to the DOJ as a State Prosecutor in 1991. She was designated head of the GRP TWG on Ancestral Domain and, in such capacity, was appointed as an alternate member of the panel only in July 2007. She graduated Bachelor of Laws Second Honors at the Ateneo de Manila University (AdeMU) in 1985. She is connected by affinity to Mindanao through her husband and in-laws from Cotabato City.

The first thing that has to be said about these people in the recently dissolved GRP Peace Panel is that it would have been completely out of character for them to commit any “grave abuse of discretion” in their negotiations with the MILF. They just are not the type. Thus, Cotabato Archbishop Orlando B. Quevedo, OMI, had been able to say: “At present, I give the MOA-AD and the two peace panels the benefit of the doubt. They have worked at the agreement for years, painstakingly hammering out every word and every phrase, every concept and its implications. I know that they have the interests of their respective constituencies always in mind.”

Secondly, their credentials speak for themselves in terms of competence and loyalty. How can anyone doubt the loyalty of Gen. Garcia who did his part in “defending every inch of Philippine territory,” particularly from Moro rebels in Mindanao? How can anyone doubt the competence of Prof. Rodil when it comes to Mindanao history, the Moro Problem, the peace processes with the MNLF and MILF, ancestral domain, and the Lumads? He was practically the institutional memory between the successive peace negotiations with the MNLF and then with the MILF.

Atty. Armamento is actually only one of several good Ateneo lawyers, all students of their constitutionalist guru Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., who grappled with the legalities and constitutionalities of the ancestral domain negotiations. And Bernas himself has lent his constitutionalist expertise to this peace effort. An interesting sidelight to all these are some prominent UP lawyers tending to be on the other side of the MOA debate. (But let’s not forget the provincial or promdi lawyers on both sides.)

Thirdly, all – yes, all — of the panel members have a connection to Mindanao, even Bulaqueño Gen. Garcia who had a long military stint in Mindanao, and Antiqueña Atty. Armamento who still visits her in-laws in Cotabato City. As for those Mindanao natives in the panel, there was a nice tri-people mix: Prof. Rodil who is of Christian settler family background, Sec. Pangandaman who is a Moro, and Ms. Paraguya who is a Lumad. She also represents NGOs and women. And still on the matter of mix or balance, there was good enough gender balance of three men and two women (at least better than the MILF’s all-men panel).

I think it will be hard to find another good panel like this. We said earlier that negotiators are people first, human beings with families too. In the end, for them, as for any of us I suppose, the most important appraisal is that which comes from one’s loved ones, like one’s own children who will ask you in the future what you did for their peace when you had the historical chance to do something. Take Prof. Rodil. He has been declared persona non grata by the City Council of Iligan where he lives. But his grown-up daughter Amillah writes, with much maturity:

“As of yesterday [Sept. 3], GMA has officially dissolved the government panel for peace talks with the MILF. (Disclosure to those who don’t know: my dad was part of the panel). I feel sad because I know how the panel has been working hard to achieve a deal. They were aiming to sign a final peace agreement by 2010. The controversial (and I think, misunderstood) Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain was part of the deal, and now it has also been scrapped along with the panel.”

“Attributing the breakdown of the talks to the Memorandum of Agreement itself is not fair. It was an attempt at a solution, and not (as some people think) something that GMA just thought of to extend her term. It was the result of years of negotiation. I believe what contributed to the breakdown of the talks was the series of knee-jerk chain reactions of the people involved.”

“For the good of all involved, I hope the ceasefire holds, and negotiations resume at some point. But the work to be done is not just with the negotiators. We should all be involved in creating a culture of peace, and it can be as simple as breathing deeply and thinking things through before opening your mouth, marching in the streets, attacking people, or ditching years of work down the drain.”

One big group of Mindanao civil society peace advocates, the Mindanao Peoples Caucus (MPC), through its Chair Prof. Octavio A. Dinampo (remember him who was kidnapped with Ces Oreña-Drilon), for their part, sent out this text message: “All said and done, we still salute the courage and sincerity of Sec. Garcia and Sec. Esperon in pushing hard not only peace but the very Moro right to self-determination… we’ll remember that.” And then to Sec. Garcia: “We protest vehemently the insinuation of your mishandling the peace process. Forgive them for they know not what they are doing. And be assured of our solidarity with you and Sec. Esperon.”

Finally, what about the “adversary,” the MILF Peace Panel, what does it have to say about its dissolved GRP counterpart? Sometimes, the ultimate compliment comes from the adversary. MILF Peace Panel Chairman Mohagher Iqbal formally wrote Sec. Garcia: “We were saddened by the news that the GRP Peace Panel has been dissolved effective September 3, 2008. We felt that, indeed, the peace process has lost people whom we personally know are competent, trustworthy and sincere in addressing the long struggle of the Bangsamoro people…” Iqbal went on to say:

“We will always treasure the fruits of our hard work, sleepless nights and sometimes our constructive disagreements to thread together the two very far ends (very far when we started) of issues, particularly ancestral domain… This was not the end of the long journey to peace in Mindanao, but it initially showcased how far sovereignty and right to self-determination can harmonize and accommodate each other…”

“On behalf of the MILF Peace Negotiating Panel, we bid farewell to our worthy partners in peace, as my honorable counterpart puts it. Let me thank the good Secretary Rodolfo Garcia, Prof. Rudy Rodil, Atty. Leah Armamento, Atty. Sedfrey Candelaria, Sec. Nasser Pangandaman, and the energetic head of your secretariat, Director Ryan Mark Sullivan. We will never forget you and your wonderful team and we hope that in some future time and occasion we meet and cross paths for the sake of peace and humanity.”

Right now, it is the GRP and MILF themselves which should meet and cross paths for the sake of peace and humanity.

[Soliman M. Santos, Jr. is a Bicolano human rights lawyer, peace advocate, legal scholar; A.B. History cum laude (UP), LL.B. (UNC), LL.M. (Melb); author of The Moro Islamic Challenge: Constitutional Rethinking for the Mindanao Peace Process (UP Press, 2001), Peace Advocate (DLSU Press, 2002), Dynamics and Directions of the GRP-MILF Peace Negotiations (Alternate Forum for Research in Mindanao, 2005), and Peace Zones in the Philippines (Gaston Z. Ortigas Peace Institute, 2005); and co-author of Philippine Human Development Report 2005: Peace, Human Security and Human Development in the Philippines (Human Development Network, 2005). You can reach him at gavroche23@gmail.com.This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it ]

PIKIT, North Cotabato (MindaNews/10 September) — In a recent article I wrote which was roughly titled “A New Perspective on the Mindanao Problem Based on Some Historical and Current Realities”, I tried to surmise some lessons and current insights based on the experience with the peace process as it has been. They may be worth mentioning here:

Lessons

- there is no one-shot formula to peace but any peaceful means is worth trying;

- any attempt to build peace will not succeed unless we build a critical mass of supportive peace constituency;

- people outside of the direct parties in the conflict should be given the chance to participate because the concern for peace is not confined to the direct parties just as the effect of conflict is;

- peace is not merely the absence of armed confrontation but it is social justice in all its form; and

- the ultimate goal of any peace effort is “personal cleansing”, that is, freeing one’s mind and heart from homegrown hatred, polarity, and giving dignity to every human being.

Current Insights

One of the strategic approaches to the Mindanao problem is the need to balance national sovereignty and Bangsamoro aspirations for self-determination. As always, the balancing act is not easy because it boils down to the issue of whether or not the Constitution shall be considered as one of the frameworks of the negotiation. A more creative approach is needed to achieve a perfect balance between the Constitution being a fundamental law and self-determination being an inherent right recognized by international law. As to how, only the direct parties are in the best position to determine in a negotiation. Then, consultation with the broad base of the population can take place after a draft is finalized not while it is being negotiated as most people would assert.

It is always possible to explore extra-constitutional means of settling the issue, according to Prof. Randy David, and try to craft out solutions “outside the box”. But how do we look at “agreements” reached out of the bounds of what is allowable under the Constitution? Is it not simply unconstitutional? Or, an out-of-constitution settlement can be allowed for as long as they are generally in the best interest of both parties? It would seem that the bottom-line here is coming out with a clear definition and understanding of the nature of the “agreement” that may be crafted between the GRP and the MILF. If it is a local agreement, ipso facto it is subordinate to the Constitution. If it assumes the nature and character of an international agreement then it can stand outside the sphere of the Philippine Constitution.

There is a need to revolutionize our understanding of the term “sovereignty” as it applies to territorial integrity of a given state and as it is used to connote power and authority. In this sense, Mastura emphasized the traditional Moro statehood “earned sovereignty” is already encapsulated by the Republic in its present form and structure as an autonomous entity presently in existence before the family of nations. Those who speak for the Philippines configure their constituencies into a political community which has beclouded a number of contested constitutional issues in the GRP-MILF negotiation.

The MOA on Ancestral Domain, though unsigned, should be seen as a faithful and earnest attempt to provide a leeway to provide balance between the zealously guarded issues of constitutionalism and sovereignty vis-a-vis self-determination and freedom. The MOA-AD may no longer become operational but it is to be appreciated as a document that embodies hard-earned consensus that somehow manifested that it is possible for some Filipinos and Moros to come to terms even under the most difficult circumstances.

Given a rejected MOA on Ancestral Domain, and maybe eventually a failed negotiation, “the only option available for the Bangsamoro, in lieu of armed struggle, is to revert to the original goal of independence and mount a campaign for decolonization under the auspices of the United Nations and the International Court of Justice” (Atty. Buat). This is, logically, the next best thing. In most bilateral negotiations powerful mediators are necessary requisites to peaceful settlements in almost all sovereignty-based conflicts. From my view, the GRP’s respect for Malaysia as mediator and facilitator in the peace talks is diminished. At the very least, it has doubted Malaysia’s resolve to stay neutral in the negotiation — a suspicion which could have possibly sprung out from the fact that Malaysia is a country being led by Muslims and one of the parties in the talks is Bangsamoro Muslim. While there were open statements on this one, no evidence, however, was cited.

The remaining years of the Arroyo administration (one year and nine months) may still be useful to a certain extent if it can somehow maintain the ceasefire, enhance rehabilitation and development works, and pursue consultation and dialogue, information and education, and building of a constituency supportive to the peace process. It may no longer appear to be a credible negotiator in the eyes of the MILF, after it has reneged on its obligation to sign the MOA-AD, but it can enhance or even just preserve the fundamentals necessary for the next round of talks which may still be possible in the next administration.

To sum it up, the Mindanao problem has taken new dimensions. The issues and controversies involved had become as ticklish as the attitude of people who were supposed to have expressed resolve to do something about it and to bring the peace process towards an acceptable compromise. Slowly but surely, the peace process may be headed towards a kind of reality in Physics: “When an irresistible force meets and immovable object something has to give up”. We can only pray that it is not people’s precious lives and hard-earned properties that should be given up.

Now, it is high time to ponder on how a new peace talk between the GRP and the MILF may proceed. Whether that is going to take place in this administration (of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo) or in the next is immaterial. The fundamental requirements are the same and only the frameworks and talking points may adapt new patterns and form considering the lessons and realities of past and recent experience with (or of) the peace process.

The fundamental realities stay the same as in:

It is inherently necessary that the peace process and the peace negotiation must continue. No civilized society in its right mind can allow a climate of un-peace and its dire consequences to continue to flourish indefinitely;

It is compelling for both parties (GRP & MILF) to come to terms sooner or later, otherwise, they suffer the consequences of the impatience, ire and loss of faith of their respective populace and constituents in the long run; and

Both parties have suffered enough. While “negotiation fatigue” is likely for either side or both, especially given what I call the “lullaby strategy” of the GRP in dilly-dallying the peace process, the drive to succeed should not be absent from both sides.

The latest fiasco in the peace talks was clearly the offshoot of the following circumstances:

The GRP’s lack of transparency on its part;

As a consequence thereof, some politicians (Piñol, Lobregat, Roxas, Drilon) reacted by questioning the MOA on Ancestral Domain before the Supreme Court. The Piñol-Lobregat petition was simply a mandamus-like relief to require the parties to make available copies of the MOA-AD. It was then logical that the Supreme Court had to restrain the signing of the MOA-AD to give time for people, or just the petitioners, to study the contents of said document. After said petition is served, the TRO may be lifted in due time and the MOA-AD may still be signed thereafter. What really complicated the matter was the Roxas-Drilon intervention asking the Supreme Court, not only to restrain the signing but also to rule on the MOA’s constitutionality. And this has prolonged the “legal due process”;

The non-signing of the MOA prompted two “uncontrolled” commanders of the MILF (Kato and Bravo) to stage attacks in North Cotabato and Lanao del Norte which also triggered similar actions, presumably by the MILF also, in Sarangani;

Consequently, these “atrocities” were exhaustively used as excuse by the GRP to further justify its position of not signing the MOA “at gunpoint”. Now, criminal cases were filed against Kato, Bravo et al and the rest is a matter of “police action”. To concretize its position of not signing the MOA-AD, the Arroyo administration came out with the DDR (demilitarization, demobilization, reintegration) as added frameworks in the negotiation. “The DDR is more of a war strategy than a peace framework”, according to one respected personality in the peace process. As if this was not enough, the Arroyo administration announced the dismantling of the GRP negotiating panel to signal its complete abandonment of the peace talks;

The unspoken reality, however, was that the GRP may have realized that its panel was outsmarted by the MILF panel when they saw a somewhat “lopsided” agreement from its point of view. But that was at no fault of the MILF. If the MILF panel was the better negotiator as compared to the GRP panel, that was no reason for the GRP to blame the product. After all, in all probabilities the GRP must have carefully selected the members of its panel.

Given the fundamental realities, how then must the peace talks proceed if and when resumed in the future? Fr. Mercado says: “After an adequate period of dispassionate, informed and intelligent discussion of the concepts and issues by all concerned, after some sanity is restored, the time should come when the parties can viably continue the peace negotiations, presumably from where they left off”.

There are hitches that should be surmounted before the peace talks can resume. If the “talks” resume in the time of the Arroyo administration, the DDR is the first issue to be resolved. If it resumes in the next administration, it will depend on whether or not the new administration adapts or drops some of the frameworks and policies put forward by the Arroyo administration.

The Arroyo administration has learned a painful lesson from the botched Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain and hope that it, or the government in general, will be better prepared for new talks in the future.

How a new peace talk may proceed…

First, what is needed is a clear, written instruction from the President to the government panel on what it can negotiate with the MILF and what it can sign. At the recent Supreme Court hearing on petitions against the proposed memorandum, Solicitor General Agnes Devanadera said the government panel had authority only to negotiate, not to sign. Fresh instructions for a prospective new panel should spell out clearly the extent of its mandate.

Second, the new panel should be headed by a diplomat who is experienced in international negotiations, not by a retired general who may bring his military mindset to the negotiating table. True, Gen. Manuel Yan was a military general who headed the panel that negotiated with the MNLF, but he was an experienced diplomat before he was appointed to the position. A diplomat is trained to bargain hard, but do it in a tactful manner.

Third, the negotiators have to be backed by a strong panel of experts in constitutional and international law. Had the just disbanded GRP panel been backed by experts in constitutional and international law, it should have taken a more proactive position in defending the MOA rather than silenced by attacks from the media and some politicians.

Fourth, public hearings should be conducted on the main points of the proposed agreement, principally in Mindanao and in key cities of the country. All the stakeholders should be invited to these hearings so that the negotiating panel can hear various views and obtain various perspectives. In the case of the botched MOA-AD, it appears that no public hearings were conducted, and the first time most people, including high-ranking government officials, heard about the proposed agreement was only a few days before it was scheduled to be signed.

Fifth, an extensive and continuing public information campaign has to be conducted on the proposed agreement to keep the people updated on the progress of the negotiations. In the case of the collapsed MOA, it appears that the administration was determined to keep the agreement secret and concealed from the people. Even senators and congressmen didn’t know about the contents of the memorandum, and were furnished copies only after there was a hue and cry in the media and public forums.

Sixth, the government should define the timing of public consultations to allow open, impassionate and intelligent discussions to take place. It is to be admitted that the publics and media cannot intervene at the sensitive formation stage of the issues. Atty. Michael O. Mastura, senior member of the MILF panel, emphasized that “healthy environment for serious debate (should not be) drowned out by the intrusion of the mass media into the negotiating process (which only) encourages the politics of fear at the Metro Manila capital..”

Finally, the GRP panel should act like the MILF panel. The former is more arbitrary as compared to the latter. The problem with the President is sometimes she equates trust and respect with accommodation. Thus, she makes appointments more on the basis of political accommodation even if she has little of the trust and respect on the appointee. This was quite clear in the case of General Garcia and, more recently, Luis ‘Chavit’ Singson.

We hope the President, if not, the next Administration will do it in more absolute terms next time. We hope the government panel will get it right and do it right next time. (MindaViews is the opinion section of MindaNews. The author is a freelance writer, social researcher and professor in the graduate studies. He holds a doctorate degree in rural development. He has been involved in peace advocacy efforts since early 1980s. Presently, he serves as Executive Assistant to the Mayor of Pikit, North Cotabato and Adviser to a group of local peace advocates based in the same town.)

As Vilma’s son-in-law, Mohalidin Unsi, also began to sob, the Bangsamoro Youth Leaders’ Forum, the organizers of the press conference, quickly turned off the Powerpoint Presentation of photographs and video footage of what happened here Monday morning of September 8.

It took some time for Vilma and Mohalidin to regain composure, Vilma, especially, because since Monday, she has had to recount the tragedy of losing an entire family, before investigators, NGO representatives and relief workers, neighbors and the media. She had just visited her son, 13-year old Guiamaludin, who is recuperating from leg wounds. Immediately after the press conference, she was going to rush back to Datu Piang to breastfeed her newly-born,  Fairudz,  a survivor of war.

Fairudz was 16 days old  when she lost her father and five siblings.

Vilma and Mohalidin stressed “there was no firefight” in Barangay Tee early that morning as the military alleged. “The planes just came and fired away.”

“There was no encounter between government and MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) forces. The planes suddenly arrived and bombed the pumpboat,”  Vilma said in Maguindanao.

”There was no encounter. The planes just suddenly came,” Mohalidin said.  He counted “three double-bodies (apparently referring to Layang or SF 260); two OV-10s and two helicopters.”

In the rush to flee Barangay Tee, Vilma, who was carrying her baby, Fairudz, and Mohalidin, got separated from the rest of the family and boarded another “pumpboat” (actually a small motorized banca) towards this barangay, at least a kilometer from the highway).

Their boats were at the tailend of a convoy. How many boats were in the convoy, neither Vilma nor Mohalidin could say.

Vilma’s boat was 10 to 15 meters away from the boat carrying her husband, Daya Manunggal, and their six children – the pregnant Aida, Guiamaludin,  Bailyn, Zukarudin,  Adtayan and Faidza — when a bomb – or a rocket fired from the sky – exploded near the boat.

Only Guiamaluddin survived from that boat. His eldest sister and three younger siblings died instantly. Another sister, Bailyn, died on the way to the hospital in Cotabato City, some 54 kilometers away. Daya’s body was recovered the next day.

Mohalidin said Daya, apparently fearing the boat would capsize because of their number and because a sack of rice was also loaded on it, stopped at an  “island” (a small land mass) with about two or three huts, and had just asked his children to disembark when the something exploded a few meters away.

Mohalidin counted seven aircraft hovering when villagers rushed to their small motorized bancas, to flee Tee for “safer grounds” in Butilen, across the marshland. In the third week of August, the start of the renewed hostilities between government and the MILF, the Mandi-Manungal family had fled Sitio Dagaren in Barangay Tee for sanctuary in Barangay  Butalo and returned home on September 1.

Mohalidin  doesn’t remember how many bombs exploded the morning they sought refuge from war.  In his limited Pilipino, he said, “di ko kayang bilangin, basta marami” (I can’t count how many, but plenty)

Zainar Mukalan, who lives close to the highway and Butalo bridge, told MindaNews  there was no exchange of gunfire before the bombs were dropped.

Military sources say the exchange of gunfire in a setting such as a vast marshland, can be heard from as far as five to seven kilometers away at daytime or 10 kilometers at nighttime.

Zainar, in his 50s, says the planes came at around 9 a.m. but did not fire until around 10. He said he heard three explosions, one of which, he later learned, killed the children.

The view from the highway beside Zaimar’s house. Photo by CO Arguillas

From the back of his house and from the highway itself, one could get a good view of what was happening that morning.

The best vantage view was from the Butalo bridge, some 30 meters away from Zainar’s.house.

Zainar said soldiers stationed at the bridge, who could clearly see who was approaching along the river and the marshland, were on ready-fire position. None of them managed to fire, however, as residents and the barangay captain of Tee told asked them hold their fire as the convoy of at least five boats carrying villagers from Barangay Tee, was  approaching Butilen.

Zainar was from Barangay Tee himself but during an evacuation five years ago, opted to live here close to the highway, the bridge and the barangay hall of Tee (the barangay hall was moved from Tee to Butilen about a decade ago as more residents of Tee evacuated to Butilen. As of August 1, 2007, the National Statistics and Coordination Board recorded Tee’s population at 1,724 out of  Datu Piang’s 49,971).

Musib Uy Tan, the mayor’s executive assistant told MindaNews that reports reaching them also indicated that residents heard no exchange of gunfire before the bombings. 

The government’s Information Coordination Center on September 9 reported that military authorities denied Air Force planes dropped bombs in Barangay Tee.

“The government forces were continuing its limited operations against the forces of the rogue MILF leader Umbra Kato but were adopting an adjusted law enforcement operations in deference to Ramadhan.  Col. Marlou Salazar, the 601^st brigade commander, whose forces were involved in the military operations, said that the troops were in the barangay based on civilian reports that Wahid Tundok, Kato’s right hand man, and possibly Kato himself, were in the area. As the troops entered the barangay, they were met by gunfire from the MILF forces in the area. Heavy exchange of fires between the forces commenced at around 9:55 a.m,” the report said.

Towards dusk. Another view from the highway Photo by CO Arguillas

“Ground troops are still in the area and are engaged in sporadic firefights as they go through their clearing operations. The group commander of the air force planes that flew over Barangay Tee, Colonel Jojo Robles, likewise denied reports that bombs were used in the military operation,” the report said. 

The report noted that the “the helicopters, Layang (SF 260) planes and OV-10 planes were sent upon the request of the ground forces to assist them in their operations against the lawless MILF in the area.

Their mission, the report said,  was to conduct “persuasion” and “reconnaissance flights over the river and marsh areas “to assist the ground forces in locating and determining the involvement of the lawless MILF forces.”

“According to Col. Robles, initially, the Air Force helicopters and planes did not find the MILF troops on the river, marsh area and the ground so they were ordered to return to base.  However, on the way back, the Layang planes were fired upon by the MILF forces. Since the rules of engagement of the air forces is to retaliate if fired, upon, the planes fired back after verifying and confirming the location of the lawless MILF forces from the ground forces,”  the report said.  (Carolyn O. Arguillas/MindaNews)

COTABATO CITY (MindaNews/07 September) — In the aftermath of the ruthless attacks by three MILF field commanders on civilian populations in North Cotabato, Lanao del Norte, and Sarangani, the question of the MILF as a terrorist organization has again been raised.

The issue: Is the MILF a terrorist organization and should it be officially declared so? 

The usual non-Moro response is, “Yes. The MILF has once again revealed its true colors. It has attacked towns and villages. It has gone on a rampage, killing innocent civilians, murdering, burning, pillaging, looting, using civilians as human shields – these are terrorist acts. Therefore, the MILF is a terrorist organization.”

The Moro general reaction seems to be: “Indeed, these acts are not morally unjustifiable. They are to be condemned. But these do not make the MILF a terrorist organization. These acts were perpetrated by MILF commanders acting on their own against MILF official policy. We deeply regret such acts. They have given a bad name to the MILF. They have seriously set back the peace process.”

Listening to many Moros speak on this issue, I would add the following remarks to this general Moro reaction: “Like us these MILF commanders were angry at the rejection of the MOA-AD by the government. Like us they saw the long peaceful work towards the recognition of our aspirations for self-determination dismissed by the Supreme Court. Anger led them to violence. We do not agree with their reaction but we can understand why.” I might also add this reaction by a few radically inclined Moro thinkers: “We are not asking for independence. But if the government refuses to recognize our fundamental right to self-determination, why don’t we all unite and just go ahead and fight for independence?”  

In the light of such context, the real question is: Does the brutal violence of three MILF commanders on civilian populations in Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato, and Sarangani make the whole MILF organization terrorist?

Many Christians all over the Philippines would say yes. Against the opinion of many of my own Christian flock whom I serve as Archbishop, I say no.

May I submit the following points for sober reflection:

1. Among the scores of MILF commanders in Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Shariff Kabungsuan, South Cotabato, Sarangani, Davao del Sur, Davao del Norte, Zamboanga del Norte, Zamboanga del Sur, Basilan, Sulu and Taw-Tawi, how many actually supported the action of the three commanders?
2. How many instead followed the official policy of the MILF about civilian populations?
3. Did the MILF Central Committee authorize the action of the three commanders?
4. Did the Central Committee not try to stop the three commanders?
5. Did our own military and ceasefire mechanisms not try to limit military objectives and the areas of operation so as to target only the forces of the three commanders?
6. Did the three commanders act like the Abu Sayaff and take 12 or even only two “kidnappable” people for ransom when they could have easily done so?
7. Does not the MILF Central Committee believe that the actions of its three commanders have seriously set back the peace process?
8. If the MILF were a terrorist organization like the Abu Sayaff and Al-Qaeda, would it even have ceased fighting to talk peace?
9. Would it ever have cooperated with our military to go after bandits going to their areas of influence?
10. Did investigations on atrocities committed against our Marines in Basilan provide evidence that such atrocities were perpetrated by MILF ambushers?
    

On the other hand:

We do not believe that our own government with our own military is terrorist, even if:

1. We had military commanders leading so called “lost commands” that operated freely on their own in Mindanao;
2. Our troops never really pursued them and rooted them out;
3. We never brought them to the courts of justice;
4. Fanatical vigilante groups known for their ruthlessness against Moro civilians were tolerated and even worked quietly with our military commanders;
5. Our military forces attacked Camp Abubakar, reportedly hours after an accord for ceasefire had been agreed upon;
6. We never investigated and brought to justice our own soldiers who were accused by human rights organizations for abuses against civilians, whether Moros or non-Moros;  

Reflecting on the above questions and soberly responding to them would surely bring us to a wiser position on the issue of terrorism. We need to be more logical and wise in judging the MILF organization as terrorist on the ground that some of its commanders have perpetrated terrorist acts. The actions of a few are not necessarily the actions of the whole.\

Mutatis mutandis we also apply, I believe, the same principle and the same logic regarding “scalawags” in the Church, media, military, police, executive, judiciary, and legislative branches of government. We do not necessarily judge the whole by the actions of the few.  

(MindaViews is the opinion section of MindaNews. Peacetalk is open to anyone who wants to contribute his/her views on peace in Mindanao. Orlando B. Quevedo, OMI is the Archbishop of Cotabato and former two-term President of the Catholic Bishops Conference of the Philippines. He was CBCP President during the 2000 and 2003 wars against the MILF).

Government has just announced that it has dissolved the peace panel negotiating with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which according to the Palace is “consistent with the President’s new policy of no longer talking with armed groups but authentic dialogues with communities.” 

The Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy strongly disagrees with this latest decision from the government that ironically came a day after the 12th year anniversary of the signing of the Final Peace Agreement between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), an agreement that was successfully signed in 1996 but problematically implemented. This is a decision that we feel is not motivated by the desire to achieve peace in Mindanao but is intended to sanitize the mess it created with respect to the memorandum on agreement on ancestral domains (MOA-AD).

PCID views this as a serious setback to peace in Mindanao. It lay to waste the efforts of both peace panels over the past ten years. PCID commends the efforts of the GRP Peace Panel through the leadership of Gen. Rodolfo Garcia and the MILF Peace Panel chaired by Mohagher Iqbal for their indefatigable commitment to reach a just agreement for peace in Mindanao.

The series of missteps the government has taken including the decision to renege on its commitments by not signing the MOA-AD and the dissolution of the peace panel are serious blows to the government’s credibility in talking peace. How can any rebel group now be assured that the government will not turn its back on its commitment because of the political hysterics of some personalities? Isn’t the dissolution of the peace panel an admission of the failed peace policy of Arroyo’s administration?

Mrs. Arroyo also stated: “We must bring stability in the region and regain order before we can effectively reactivate the peace process in earnest.” She added, “Let me take this opportunity to be very clear to those elements who seek disruption and destruction. There will be no peace gained through violence. No peace agreement will be reached through intimidation or the barrel of the gun.”

We couldn’t agree more. But if she were sincere in that pronouncement, why doesn’t she exert effort to ensure that a ceasefire commences which would put a halt to the conflict in Mindanao? Is government’s strategy of achieving peace accomplished by destroying it? Government cannot advocate peace through press releases. It has to institute confidence-building measures so that the fighting will stop. And dissolving the peace panel at this time is certainly not the correct signal to send for peace.

PCID would like to reiterate its vehement condemnation of the violence that has cost the lives of civilians in Mindanao. We believe that the perpetrators should be brought to justice. But there is already a ceasefire mechanism in place that has been very effective in reducing violence in the past.

Government cannot raise an olive branch with one hand and carry a gun with the other.

From the Office of Amina Rasul
Philippine Council for Islam and Democracy
Unit 2D Tower 1 Governor’s Place Condominium
Shaw Blvd., Mandaluyong City
Tel. 532-6058; 5313522
www.pcid.org.ph