4th of a series

GENERAL SANTOS CITY(MindaNews/17 September) — If Muslim Autonomy, whether it is the ARMM or the BJE version, is real autonomy, it must have a strong economic economy. With weak economy like what the present ARMM has, political autonomy is meaningless. From this, the Bangsamoro quest in MOA-AD for their ancestral domain, lands and other resources must be understood.

III. Resources

The 12-consensus-point strand “Resources” is controversial because of the powers granted the BJE in the development of the economic resources of the Moro Homeland. By these powers, the Moro Homeland is free from the control of the Manila government – unlike in the case of the ARMM — with a partnership, not a benefactor-beneficiary or master-subject relationship.

Curiously, it should be asked:

What is wrong in empowering the BJE “with authority and responsibility for the land use, development, conservation and disposition of the natural resources within the homeland”? (Consensus 1) (See also: Consensuses 2 and 3)

What is wrong with the rationale behind the grant of such powers: to “reinforce their economic self-sufficiency”?

Strategic Minerals

Of the four “measures to make progress more rapid” enumerated under Consensus 1, stimulating the local economy to address unemployment and living conditions (b), uprooting the causes of poverty (c), and reviewing “public services, industrial or trade-related and agrarian related issues”(d) should be positively appreciated.

What is being objected to as excessive, as well as unconstitutional, is Consensus 1.a that empowers the BJE: “Entry into joint development, utilization and exploitation of natural resources designed as commons and shared resources, which is tied to the full setting of appropriate institution, particularly affecting strategic minerals.”

This suggests that the BJE can enter into joint ventures with domestic and foreign investors in the exploitation of the natural resources — in particular strategic minerals which under Section 2 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution “shall be under the full control and supervision of the State”.

The ARMM, under R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054, is vested with the authority to control and supervise the “exploration, utilization, development and protection of mines and minerals” within the region except “the strategic minerals”. This is also stipulated in the 1996 GRP-MNLF Final Peace Agreement.

“Strategic minerals” are “uranium petroleum and other fossil fuels, mineral oils, all sources of potential energy”. These are speculated to be abundant in the ARMM. Is economic autonomy not essential to Muslim autonomy? Is withholding these strategic minerals not undermining economic autonomy?

The policy is cockeyed. The ARMM can explore, use, develop and protect mineral resources (R.A. 9054, Article XII, Section 5) but not the highly demanded strategic minerals which are reserved for the national government. Yes, the choicest cuts are always for the masters.

Foreign Trade

Consensus 4 has two very controversial stipulations:

First, “The BJE is free to enter into any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries” with the condition “that such relationships and understandings do not include aggression against the Government of the Republic the Philippines”.

Second, by right, the BJE has the “option to establish and open Bangsamoro trade missions in foreign countries with which it has economic cooperation agreements”.

These agreements are condemned for being unconstitutional. But the ARMM can enter into economic agreements: “Subject to the provisions of the Constitution, the Regional Government shall evolve a system of economic agreements and trade compacts to generate block grants for regional investments and improvements of regional economic structures which shall be authorized by law enacted by the Regional Assembly.” (R.A. 9054, Article IX, Section 11)

While not explicitly said, Section 11 implies that the “economic agreements and trade compacts” are between the ARMM and foreign countries. The MOA-AD is explicit: “any economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries”. Is the implicit constitutional but the explicit unconstitutional?

If foreign trade relations are constitutional as implied in Section 11, why should trade missions be unconstitutional? They are necessary to promote trade relations.

MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari, as ARMM governor, spent much of his first year in office as a one-man trade mission to foreign capitals inviting investors to invest in the ARMM and other SZOPAD provinces. Did he violate the 1987 Constitution?

Int’l Meetings

Consensus 4 has more controversial stipulations:

Third, “… the Central Government shall take necessary steps to ensure the BJE’s participation in international meetings and events, e.g. ASEAN meetings and other specialized agencies of the United Nations.”

Fourth, this obligation of the Central Government (Third, above) “shall entitle the BJE’s participation in Philippine official missions and delegations that are engaged in the negotiation of border agreements or protocols for (a) environment protection,(and b) equitable sharing of incomes and revenues, in the areas of sea, seabed and inland seas or bodies of water adjacent to or between islands forming part of the ancestral domain, in addition to those of fishing rights”.

Objections to these agreements have no constitutional basis but spring from anti-Muslim bias and prejudices akin to ridicule: The Muslims are demanding too much, not so different from how masters sneer at their subjects who desire to be treated as equals.

However, these are essentially the same as the GRP-MNLF agreement on Muslim right to representation in the national government and organs of the state, Paragraphs 63-67, 1996 FPA. These are embodied in R.A. 9054, Article V, Sections 4-7.

The “system of economic agreement and trade compacts” is for the ARMM to generate funds for the regional economy. Consensus 4 should be viewed similarly instead of viewing it with anti-Muslim bias, prejudice and cynicism.

International meetings and Philippine official missions, including the President’s state visits, offer opportunities to invite investors. Should the BJE be denied such opportunities?

Negotiations of border agreements or environmental protection adjacent to the Moro Homeland involve BJE economic and related interests. Should the BJE be denied the right to cooperate with the national government to protect and promote regional and national interests?

Two More

Also objected to in Consensus 6 is the 75-25 sharing with the national government in favor of the BJE of revenues generated in the region. In R.A. 6734, the sharing is 60-40; in R.A. 9054, 70-30, except in strategic minerals which is 50-50. Will this redound to better fiscal stability?

Consensus 7 provides that:

(1)  “The legitimate grievances of the Bangsamoro people arising from any unjust dispossession of their territorial and proprietary rights, customary land tenures, or their marginalization shall be acknowledged.”

(2)  “Whenever restoration is no longer possible, the GRP shall take effective measures or adequate reparation collectively beneficial to the Bangsamoro people , in such quality, quantity and status to be determined mutually by both Parties.”

The MNLF did not demand these during the negotiations of the Tripoli Agreement of 1976 or of the Peace Agreement of 1996. The first is exacting acknowledgment of injustice done; the second, reparation for such injustice.

This is a daring but not a novel demand that should be weighed by its merits. There were cases in the United States when the Indians were awarded by the U.S. Supreme Court compensations for illegal dispossession of their lands covered by treaties.

The Rest

The last five consensus points under “Resources” should occasion no controversy. They are regulatory and organizational – unless the authority given the BJE and its relation with the national government is questioned.

Consensuses 8 and 9: The authority granted the BJE has also been given to the ARMM in Article XII, Section 5(d) of R.A. 9054: “Except as provided in this Organic Act, existing leases, permits, licenses, franchises, and concessions shall be respected until their expiration unless legally terminated earlier as provided by law enacted either by Congress or by the Regional Assembly”.

Consensus 10 calls for the establishment of “a five-member BJE economic-expert mission” or “the Mission” the functions of which are detailed in Consensuses 11 and 12. There is no similar concession in either R.A. 6734 or R.A. 9054 for the ARMM.

By its functions and membership, the establishment of the Mission is an innovative strategy for “reconstruction and development”. Examine, first, its functions and, then, its membership:

Consensus 11: “The Mission … shall cooperate fully with all organizations in involved in the implementation of the peace settlement”. And, “It shall launch a plan and joint international appeal for the reparation and development of the conflict affected areas in Mindanao.

Consensus 12: The members will be appointed by (a) the Third Party facilitator – two from international institutions, one of whom will be the chairman; (b) two by the BJE, one of whom will the co-chairman; and, (c) one member by the national government.

If the primary objective of Muslim autonomy is to empower the Bangsamoro people to become genuinely autonomous politically and economically, what is unconstitutional with their quest for resources that they can fully develop by their own efforts with assistance from the national government and the international communities?

(To Be Continued)

(”Comment” is Mr. Patricio P. Diaz’ column for MindaViews, the opinion section of MindaNews. The Titus Brandsma Media Awards recently honored Mr. Diaz with a “Lifetime Achievement Award” for his “commitment to education and public information to Mindanawons as Journalist, Educator and Peace Advocate.” You can reach him at patpdiazgsc@yahoo.com.This e-mail address is being protected from spam bots, you need JavaScript enabled to view it )

Source: Mindanews